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- Title
Cartesian Dualism: An Evaluation of Wireduan and Gilbert Ryle's Refutations.
- Authors
Steven, Samuel Olusegun
- Abstract
This paper takes a philosophical look at how the views of Gilbert Ryle and Kwasi Wiredu can be used to resolving the mind-body problem located in Rene Descartes' philosophy. The common sense account of the mind-body theory was first systematically carried out by Descartes. To him, mind and body do not only exist, they also interact. Through his notion of clear and distinct ideas, Descartes infers the existence of the mind as a thinking substance. Unlike the mind, whose character is thought, the body for Descartes is an extended thing. He insists that the point of interaction is the pineal grand, which God has worked out from the point of creation. Today, the view that body and mind interact has generated some controversies. Ryle argues that Descartes has made a category mistake by interpreting mind as a distinct substance. For Wiredu, in Akan thought system, mind does not go to constitute a person. Thus Ryle and Wiredu tend toward materialism when they argue that the source of consciousness is the brain, rather than the mind. This paper explores the claims of these philosophers: Descartes, Ryle and Wiredu. I stress that Ryle and Wiredu's views do not resolve the Cartesian problem. The paper concludes that unless the problem of the source of consciousness is tackled, the mind-body problem cannot be adequately resolved.
- Publication
KRITIKE: An Online Journal of Philosophy, 2011, Vol 5, Issue 2, p156
- ISSN
1908-7330
- Publication type
Academic Journal